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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper  focuses on interventions by governments of developing
countries that  tend to  distort economic  incentives and,  in particular, to
transfer  resources from agriculture.  Generally, as agriculture  is modernized
and an economy develops,  labor  is  transferred out of agriculture.  Parallel to
this transfer is  the need for capital deepeningl/ in agriculture  in the  form
of  investments  in land and human capital and the adoption of chemical,
biological and mechanical technology that saves on the use of the  sector's
most scarce  resources.  Since markets work imperfectly in the provision of new
agricultural technology, rural infrastructure, education and other services
that permit markets  to  function efficiently, government programs and projects
to  remedy these imperfections  are often socially profitable.  Hence, there  is
a need and an  important role for government to play in the  development
2/ process2
However,  the fact remains  that,  in  the case of many countries,  government
intervention has proved to be  ineffective or worse  than the  disease  of market
failure that  the  intervention was meant  to cure.  Evidence of extensive
intervention can be found in numerous  studies, including those  of Bale and
Lutz  for the  case of four developing countries, Gerrard and Roe's  study of
Tanzania, Bautista's  study of the Philippines,  Orden, et.  al.  for  the case  of
Peru, and several others  (Bale and Duncan, Schultz).These studies have generally found that interventions have implicitly
taxed agriculture by distorting agricultural commodity prices.  For instance,
Bale and Lutz  found agriculture  in the  four countries  they studied to be
heavily taxed, with direct welfare losses  from distortions  in agricultural
prices ranging from 10.6 percent of GNP in Egypt to  1.5 percent of GNP  in
Argentina.  Similar evidence of price distortions were  obtained in the
Tanzanian study.  Bautista found that export taxes and an overvalued exchange
rate were  the major factors contributing to depressed rice exports and low
producer prices for rice in the  Philippines.  In Peru, the subsidizing of
consumer prices led to a decline  in producer prices which were further
depressed by the  country's overvalued exchange rate.
However,  it is not interventions  in agriculture alone that are effective
in distorting economic  incentives  to  that sector.  In many countries,
concomitant with interventions  in agriculture are  interventions  in the urban-
industrial sector that have the  effect of making  this sector appear profitable
relative  to  agriculture.  These interventions,  therefore, serve both to  push
and pull resources away from agriculture.  Moreover,  there appears  to be a
pattern to  intervention among developed and developing countries which
suggests that  the maintenance of and motivation for interventions  that are
wasteful of societies resources might be  explained by a more fundamental
underlying process than simple policy mistakes.
The paper is  organized as  follows.  The next section is composed of two
parts,  the  first of which takes a closer  look at government  intervention in
foreign trade markets, with emphasis on agricultural commodities.  The second
part focuses on  interventions in agricultural procurement and marketing
activities.  The following two sections consider  some of the macro-economic
effects  of these  interventions and how they can increase a country'ssusceptibility to  shocks  in world markets.  Then, the question is  considered:
If social  economic losses  from these interventions  are  large, why in  general
are they pursued?  Comments  on the problems of removing distortions  conclude
the paper.
II.  THE PROCESS OF TRANSFERRING RESOURCES FROM AGRICULTURE
Agricultural policy in most countries  is  interwoven with policies  in
other sectors  of the economy.  Discussion is  therefore facilitated by
considering how the  intervention process  seems  to take place  in a "typical"
country.  The experience of selected countries  is  used for illustration.
Since agriculture  is  the  dominant sector in most developing countries,  it
is  often an important resource base that policy makers might tax for public
investment back into  the sector and into other sectors  to  foster development.
A tax system to  extract  this potential source of resources  is difficult
because of the  large number of spatially dispersed and heterogenous households
and the lack of infrastructural development that characterizes agriculture  in
most developing counties.  Consequently, these resources are often extracted
from agriculture  through the use of indirect methods such as  interventions
which lower the price of products  produced by the  sector.  These  interventions
give rise  to what is often referred to  as  implicit taxes.
Policy makers  are tempted to use indirect methods because food  is  a wage
good.  The share  of total  income  spent on food by low income urban households
in developing countries  is  often over  60 percent of total household
expenditures.  Hence,  interventions which lower the price  of food are
effective  in transferring resources  to the urban sector because  lower food
prices  increase real wages received by workers  in urban labor markets.  While
these  types of  interventions tend distort economic  incentives, they tend toreceive substantial support from urban households  and industrialists for
reason we  shall discuss  later.
Agriculture can clearly benefit from a transfer of resources  that are
reinvested by the public sector.  It  is  well known that markets  alone are not
effective in producing yield increasing technologies without public sector
support.  Rural households have benefited from public  investments  in yield-
increasing biological and chemical technology,  irrigation facilities and flood
control.  And, they have benefited from nonagricultural investments  that  serve
to  improve communications, lower spatial costs, and provide public utility
services,  improved educational opportunities,  and other human capital-
augmenting investments.
The social profitability of public investments  in agriculture relative  to
public  investments  in other sectors  of the economy depends,  in part, on the
level of per capita income.  As per capita income increases beyond the level
required to meet basic food needs,  the  incremental demand for nonagricultural
goods and services  tends to  exceed the  incremental demand for food.  Hence,
all  else the  same,  the returns  to resources employed in the nonagricultural
sector of the  economy tends to exceed those employed in agriculture.
Likewise, the  social return to  incremental public investments  in  the
nonagricultural sector tends  to exceed those  in agriculture.  However,  in many
developing countries, a large  fraction of the population are  still  struggling
to meet basic food needs  so  that an  increases  in  income  gives rise  to  an
increase  in the demand for food relative  to  the demand for nonagricultural
goods  and services.  Then, it is  possible for  the social  return to  an
incremental public investment in agriculture to exceed the  return to
investments  in other sectors of the economy.A recent study of 4,000 households  in the Dominican Republic provides
some quantitative  insights into  the relative magnitude of demand elasticities
for food and nonfood products  and how they depend on income  levels.  As  shown
in Table 1, total food-expenditure elasticities tend to  decline with increases
in household income.  However, for both rural and urban households, these
elasticities remain fairly large  through medium income levels.  The share  of
total household expenditure on food is  over  50 percent for  all households,
except those  in the urban high-income group.  For an economy dominated by
rural low and medium income households,  expenditure elasticities on food
actually exceed those  of housing, clothing, and other nonfood goods and
services.  The elasticity of  industrially produced commodities, namely,
clothing and other nonfood goods and services, tends to  exceed food
expenditure elasticities  only as households move  into  the highest  income
group.  In the  case of urban high-income households, expenditures  on nonfood
items exceed 60 percent of total expenditure.  Hence,  the return to private
and public investments  in agriculture may exceed returns  in the  nonfood sector
when, in the early stages of development, the rising demand for food exceeds
the  growth in demand for nonfood goods  and services.
The two fundamental issues  that arise are  the  appropriate rate of
resource transfer within and out of agriculture and the means to  carry out
the transfers. The  socially optimal rate of  transfer, for  the most part,
depends on the  discounted expected social returns  to capital  in market  and
nonmarket activities, which in turn, depend on the  expected growth in final
demand and in foreign trade  opportunities.  Approximating the  socially
optimal  rate of transfer from the agricultural sector  to just the nonmarket
sector would seem to be a heavy burden for even the most sophisticated
planning process in developing  countries.Table 1.  Total Expenditure Elasticities  and Expenditure  Shares for Food,
Housing, Clothing and Other Non Food Items, 4,028 Households,
Dominican Republic.
Food  Housing  Clothing & Other
Total  Total  Total
Exp.  1  Mean-  Exp. Share  Exp.  Share  Exp.  Share
Group  Exp.  Income  Elast. Exp.  Elast. Exp.  Elast. Exp.
RLY  71.9  82.9  1.21  0.73  0.66  0.21  0.01  0.07
RMY  128.7  139.5  1.26  0.71  0.63  0.17  0.01  0.12
RHY  264.7  304.8  0.68  0.63  0.86  0.17  1.53  0.20
ULY  111.6  120.8  0.91  0.64  1.04  0.25  1.37  0.11
UMY  223.6  250.4  0.85  0.55  1.28  0.24  1.07  0.21
UHY  610.3  646.1  0.32  0.39  0.26  0.30  2.21  0.32
Source:  T. Yen, Stagewise Estimation of a Complete Demand
Systems with Limited Dependent Variables and Nonlinear
Constraints:  An Application to Dominican Household Consumption
Data, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Agricultural and
Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul,  April,
1986.
RLY denotes  the category of rural low income households, ULY
denotes  urban low income households  etc.  The expenditure categories
are based on monthly incomes  as  follows;  for  rural households:
RLY < $100;  $100 5  RMY < $160;  $160s RHY, and for urban household:
ULY < $165;  $160 : UMY < $300;  and $3005 UHY.  The official  rate
of Peso-Dollar  exchange at  the  time this data was  collected was  1:1.
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Expenditures are mean total monthly expenditures  on all goods
and services. Income  is mean monthly income  including income in
kind.  The residual between expenditures and income  includes savings
and other unaccounted for  income.
The  first column denotes  total expenditure elasticities and the
second column denotes the  share of total expenditures  allocated to  the
particular category (e.g.,  food) listed at  the  top  of the column.The means of resource  transfer is  the critical  issue on which I want to
focus.  Relying on markets  to  transfer capital from agriculture means  giving
rural households adequate  incentives  to  accumulate and hold savings  in forms
that can be used to fund nonagricultural-type  investments.  Modern rural
capital markets often incur high transaction costs because of the  large number
of small  transactions.  While  some success  at establishing such capital
markets has been realized  (Hayami and Ruttan, pp.399-403),  their performance
is conditioned by a country's monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate policy.
Often, these policies have given rise  to  low and even negative real interest
rates, thereby discouraging savings.  Direct taxation of rural households,  as
through a land tax, was effective  in transferring saving from agriculture  in
Japan during the  first two decades of the  19th century  (Kuznets, p. 47).
However, direct taxation appears  to be an unacceptable  alternative  to land
owning classes, especially  in light of the  discrimination against agriculture
that already exists  in most developing countries.
II.A  Interventions  in Foreign Trade Markets
Governments  of many developing countries rely on the use of trade  and
exchange rate policies  to extract resources  from agriculture and then to
transfer them to  the urban-industrial sector of  the economy.  Trade and
exchange rate policies are employed, in part, because the  instruments used to
implement these policies are easily manipulated.  Furthermore,  they are  subtle
in the  sense  that their manipulation is  not as  directly observable by those
from whom the resources  are being extracted as  are  other forms  of taxation,
e.g.  a land tax.A recent USDA-University of Minnesota study provides some insights  into
the control  of foreign trade in food grains  in a number of countries.  Of the
21 countries  investigated, all employed one or more of  the following
instruments  to  control foreign trade:  an export-import state operated
monopoly, import licenses,  export taxes,  or quotas.  Nineteen countries
reported the  use of trade controls on wheat,  18 had trade controls  on rice,  15
had trade controls  on corn, 11 had trade  controls on sorghum and 4 had trade
controls on millet.  These instruments  are most often used to maintain,
relative to border market prices,  low and stable prices of food by raising
imports above free-trade levels or by discouraging the export of food crops  in
which a country has a comparative advantage.
The experience of selected countries  illustrates  this point.  Tanzania's
National Milling Corporation is  the agency with the primary responsibility for
carrying out the  country's stated policy of food grain self sufficiency.  It
maintains a statutory monopoly over the marketing and foreign trade  in grains.
Essentially, the  agency enforces  the government's  domestic price controls by
making the necessary adjustments  in its stocks or imports  in order to
equilibrate domestic  demand and supply at announced prices.  This policy has
caused substantial departures of domestic food grain prices from border market
levels.  The average  ratio of domestic to border prices over the period 1964-
1977 was  0.76  for maize, 0.64 for rice, and 1.15  for wheat.
An econometric study  (Gerrard and Roe) of Tanzania's  demand and supply
for  these crops suggested that the  government intervention implicitly taxed
maize and rice production beyond the point of absolute self-sufficiency,
defined as  the price which equilibrates demand and supply under autarky.
Consequently, Tanzania became a marginal net importer of these  grains even
though the  estimated autarky prices were below their respective border prices.The country is  a high cost producer of wheat.  Its policy of self-sufficiency
in this  crop amounted to  producing wheat on state farms  and restricting
imports so  that  domestic wheat prices exceeded border prices.
The government's choice of domestic price  levels was  constrained by the
nature of supply and demand for food and the competitiveness of  the country's
exports. The government's tendency  to lower  the price of maize relative  to  a
less  important crop in consumption was offset by the  foreign exchange losses
that would have been incurred for large departures between domestic and border
prices of maize.
Efforts to  transfer resources  from agriculture often give  rise to
declining foreign exchange earnings  and a crowding out of nonagricultural
imports  (Pitt).  In the case of Tanzania, Lofchie points out that due to  the
severe  shortage of foreign exchange and the urgent need to use remaining
currency reserves  to  finance immediate  food requirements, the government was
compelled to  impose stringent limitations on nonfood imports.  These
restrictions decreased the  importation of economically important  items such as
raw materials for industry, new capital goods,  and spare parts.  The result
was  a serious economic  depression.  Hence, in some countries,  efforts to
transfer  resources out of agriculture may actually limit resources available  to
the  domestic  industries  the country is trying to protect.
This trade-off between the control of food imports and the  scarcity of
foreign exchange  is  less pronounced for  industrial crops such as  cotton,
sugar, and coffee.  Using similar policy instruments,  these crops  are  often
taxed to an even greater extent than are food crops.  Bale and Lutz report
domestic  to border price ratios  of 0.34 and 0.58 for cotton in Egypt and
Pakistan, respectively.  In Egypt during the  late 1970's and early 1980's,
domestic long-staple cotton prices  were so  depressed that domestic cotton-processing companies were forced to  import cotton at border prices  (i.e.,  at
almost three times  the price paid to domestic producers)  in order to  operate
their plants at desirable capacities  (USAID).
The transfers imposed on sugar and coffee producers in many countries  are
more complex because of the quota systems for  these commodities.  The U.S.
quota price of sugar has been more than twice the world market price  in recent
years.  Rather than permitting these  rents to be captured by farmers, many
sugar-exporting countries have imposed relatively high export taxes  on sugar
and many have chosen to produce a large  share of national sugar production on
state farms.
In the case of the Dominican Republic  (Greene and Roe),  export taxes on
sugar in 1983 were about 36 percent of the  fob export value.  Moreover,  the
Consejo Estatal  de Azucar  (CEA),  a Dominican state owned enterprise,  controls
nearly 40 percent of the land planted to  cane.  The remaining revenues after
taxes have been used to remunerate plant, equipment, and a large and growing
state-employed labor force.
Policies  to  transfer resources from agriculture are made even more
punitive  to rural households when countries  simultaneously employ policies to
protect the domestic  industrial sector.3   Results from a recent IMF study of
35  developing countries find that  the rates of protection of manufacturing are
often higher than in most industrial countries. The average effective rate of
protection was 50 percent during 1966-72 and 60 percent in the late 1970's
(IMF 1985a, Table 64).  Exceptions  include countries  such as  Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong.  Many of the developing countries  that have high
rates  of protection for manufacturing also allow imports  of raw materials and
intermediate  inputs intended for export production to enter duty free  (IMF,
1985a. p.  74).
10Protection of the  industrial sector directly affects agriculture  in four
important ways.  First, rural households  often face higher prices for
agricultural  inputs supplied by protected industries.  Protection of  import
competing industries through tariffs  or quotas restricts world market supplies
from entering domestic markets at world market prices. Hence, domestic import-
competing industrialists have little  incentive  to expand production beyond the
demand of the domestic market.  In this  situation, domestically produced
import substitutes  are invariablly produced at high unit cost.  This often
occurs because either the  scale of the  domestic market is  sufficiently small
to preclude the operation of plant and equipment at low unit costs  or  the
licensing arrangements that  accompany trade protection is allocated to  a
limited number of firms on the basis of political patronage. Moreover, it  is
not unusual for the products of proteoted industries  to be technically
inferior to  substitutes otherwise available  in world markets. The result
tends  to be the  production of inferior products  by concentrated industries
operating at high unit  cost
Second, either as a consequence of concentrated industries  (and hence
monopsonistic behavior) high unit costs,  or both, agriculture often receives
lower prices for  commodities  that undergo additional processing in the
protected industries.  In the  case of Egypt, farm-level prices of commodities
that underwent additional processing were  often lower  than the prices in the
absence of protection.  Egyptian cotton producers would have received higher
prices  if cotton had been exported rather than processed in Egyptian plants.
Third, protection makes the  industrial sector appear profitable relative
to  agriculture and, consequently, agriculture is  forced to  compete  for
resources  that are artificially made more dear.  This  includes peak seasonal
demand for  labor and credit.  Agriculture must also compete  for public
11investments.  If the  analyses of the net social value of these  investments do
not take  into consideration the  artificially induced profitability of returns
to  investments  in the protected sectors  of the economy, then public
investments  in agriculture are likely to be  less then they would be  in the
absence  of protection.
Fourth, returns  in agriculture  are sensitive  to public investments in
activities where markets function poorly.  Hence,  to the  extent that
interventions decrease the public sector's capacity to make  these  investments,
agriculture and the economy must forego  this potential source  of gain in
4/ productivity.
Trade  interventions give rise to  a number of direct and  indirect effects
which can alter the  terms of trade between food and nonfood crops, between the
agricultural sector and the  industrial sector  and a country's  international
terms  of trade.  The prices of noninternationally traded commodities  (mostly
perishables  such as  fresh fruits, vegetables,  and, depending on the country,
livestock products) can also become distorted as resources  flow out of
commodities whose prices are distorted downward and into the production of
these nontraded commodities.  To the  extent that  the nontraded commodities  are
substituted in consumption for the commodities whose prices have been
distorted downward, the demand for  the noninternationally traded commodities
tends to  decline  thus placing additional downward pressure on the prices of
these nontraded commodities.
The direct effects  of trade interventions  alone can lead to  a transfer of
resources  from agriculture, to alter the value of sector-specific resources
and to  induce  rural to urban migration.  While the  transfer of some resources
from the  sector is expected to occur  in  the process of growth, extensive
interventions  in trade artificially induce these  transfers so  that many of the
12other adjustments,  if they occur at  all,  tend to occur  at a reduced rate.
These  include the process  of capital deepening and the  development of
infrastructure and other characteristics of growth and development in
agriculture.
Before considering these  in more detail,  I turn attention to  a second set
of interventions, common in many developing countries,  that often further
exacerbate the problems  faced by rural households.
II.B  Production and Marketing Controls
Interventions in foreign trade markets  that  induce a transfer of
resources  from agriculture  invariably lead to  depressed conditions  in the
sector.  Some governments react with policies  that subsidize  agricultural
inputs and raise farm-level commodity prices while, at  the same  time,
maintaining low and stable  food prices to urban consumers.
These policies  lead to  a narrowing of the marketing margin and, in  the
extreme case of Egypt (von Braun and de Haen, USAID) and Peru 5/ ,  to  farm-level
prices  that are higher than their equivalent retail counterparts.  Without
subsidies, the narrowing of the margin implies  lower returns  to  the resources
employed in marketing activity and hence an exodus of merchants and middlemen
traditionally involved in these activities.  The  implementation of  the policy
often amounts to  the  taking over of marketing functions  by government agencies
and state owned enterprises.  For many countries  in Africa, these  structures,
in the  form of marketing boards, have  existed from colonial  rule.
Some  insight into  the pervasiveness of production and product marketing
controls  can be obtained from the USDA-University of Minnesota study of  food
policies in developing countries.  All  21 countries  in the  study were  found to
employ some  type of domestic production and/or marketing controls  for  food
13grains.  These included procurement, processing, storage, and  transportation.
These controls were  implemented through licensing, subsidy schemes to
middlemen, and, most commonly, through state  owned enterprises. The extent of
control  in a country tended to be  in direct proportion to  the expenditure
share  of the crop in household consumption.  Eighteen countries  imposed
marketing controls  on wheat, 19  imposed controls on rice,  13  imposed controls
on maize,  and 14  imposed controls on sorghum.  The African countries  in the
study tended to employ the  largest array of controls over the most crops,
followed by Asian and then Latin American countries.
The direct budget expenditures  from implementing a policy of buying dear
and selling cheap are often increased by the losses  that seem naturally to
arise from the  inefficiencies common to many state operated enterprises.  In
the Dominican Republic, the  state owned enterprises that displace private
enterprise  in agriculture include  the Instituto Nacional de  Estabilizacion de
Precios  (INESPRE) and the previously mentioned sugar enterprise, CEA.
INESPRE's statutory objectives are  to  regulate the prices of agricultural
products  in domestic markets and to protect consumption levels  (IBRD 1985a,
p.34).  Essentially, this  agency is  the counterpart of Tanzania's National
Milling Authority.  It buys  and sells products at different points  in the
marketing chain and in international markets  so  that domestic markets clear  at
target prices.  It  also stores  commodities  to dampen the  annual variation in
market prices.  In 1983,  for  example, INESPRE had accumulated stocks valued at
one-third an entire year's production of rice plus $14 million in stocks  of
maize, edible oils,  and soybean meal  (IBRD 1985a).
The extent of CEA and INESPRE's involvement  in agriculture can be  gleaned
from their annual current operating budgets.  Their combined average annual
current expenditures amounted to nearly 40 percent of agriculture's GDP over
14the period 1976  to  1984.  While  these enterprises  are known to  contribute to
the central government's budget deficit, estimates  of their operating deficits
are difficult  to  obtain.  Conservative estimates of their average annual
deficits is  5 percent of agriculture's GDP over  the period 1976-1984.
Deficits incurred by state-owned enterprises can be large.  Estimates of
losses associated with state-owned enterprises  of all  types  in seven countries
ranged from a low of under one percent of GNP  in Korea to over ten percent of
GNP  in Sri Lanka  (Short).  Their losses also appear to be an important factor
explaining the need of some  countries to  restructure external debt.  This  is
discussed in more  detail in section IV.
III.  SOME MACRO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF INTERVENTIONS
The direct effects of interventions  give rise  to  a host of indirect
effects. The latter  invariably involve  an overvalued currency combined with
implicit import  subsidies, export taxes, and deficits on a country's trade
account.  These indirect effects cause  additional distortions  in the  terms of
trade within and between the  agricultural and industrial sector, which in
turn, serve further  to extract resources from the  agricultural sector.
The magnitude of some  of these distortions  is indicated in recent studies
of Egypt, the  Dominican Republic, and the  Philippines.  Scobie found that
central government budget deficits associated with Egypt's  food subsidies were
met by both foreign and domestic borrowing.  The concomitant expansion of the
money stock led to  an excess  supply of money balances and an excess demand for
goods, both foreign and domestic.  A 10 percent rise  in government
expenditures was found to  increase inflation by about 5.3 percent,  decrease
the stock of net foreign assets by 1.7 percent, and  devalue  the  Egyptian
pound on the black market by about  3.3 percent.
15Because food imports were the key to equilibrating domestic supply and
demand at announced prices, a decline  in foreign exchange was met first by
postponing the  import of capital goods  and raw materials, which had
deleterious effects on the output of industrial goods.  The economy was
thus made vulnerable to  fluctuating world prices of food imports.  A 10
percent deviation from trend in total industrial  imports  tended to
decrease  industrial output by 8.3 percent and  investment in industrial
capital by about 8.8 percent. Taking into consideration the share of
foreign exchange allocated to  food imports,  these estimates  implied that
a 10 percent increase  in the price of imported food resulted  in a drop
in  industrial  output  by  1 to  2  percent.
In the  case of the Dominican Republic, the direct effects  (nominal
rates of protection) of interventions  in foreign trade, procurement, and
marketing on producer prices of sugar,  coffee, and rice relative  to  a
price  index of industrial goods suggested that rice producers received a
small implicit subsidy over the period 1966 to  1985  (with the exception
of 1973 and 1974 when they received a fairly large  implicit tax).  Over
the same period, sugar producers were implicitly taxed in most years and
coffee producers were implicity taxed in all years except four  (Greene
and Roe).  Thus, the direct effects discriminated against the
agricultural export crops,  and to a much lesser extent against the main
food crop  (rice) relative to urban industrial goods.
However, estimates of the average  annual overvaluation of the
Dominican currency relative to  the dollar from 1977-84 ranged, in real
terms,  from 10 percent to  22 percent, depending on various estimates  of
implicit tariffs,  taxes, and excess demand and supply elasticities.  In
this  case, the  total direct and indirect effects of intervention on
16producer prices of sugar, coffee, and rice relative to  a price  index for
industrial goods was  estimated to  average  -33.1 percent,  -38.0 percent, and
-6.0 percent, respectively.
The traditional agricultural export crops were  thus even more heavily
taxed relative  to producers of domestic  industrial commodities.  Rice
producers were also taxed, albeit at a lower rate, relative to producers of
domestic  industrial commodities.  Yet,  the effect on rice production was
significant.  Estimates from an econometric model  (Roe and Senauer) of the
Dominican rice economy suggested that  in the absence of distortions,  rice
production would have exceeded observed levels by an annual average  of about
19 percent since  1980.  Interventions  also restrained the country's
participation in foreign trade.  Since 1977, exports  averaged about 20 percent
of real GDP.  In the absence  of interventions,  it is  estimated that exports
would have averaged about 33 percent of real GDP  (Roe and Greene).
In the  case of the Philippines, Bautista also found that interventions
since the  1950s  consistently discriminated against agricultural export
production in favor of home goods and import competing industries.  He
concludes,  "Correcting the incentive bias against agricultural export
production represents a potentially significant source of growth in
agricultural income  and foreign exchange earnings.  Institutional changes, new
technologies, infrastructure development, and other productivity-raising
public  investments may be necessary to boost significantly the long-term
export performance  of Philippine  agriculture.  However, they are likely to
prove  inadequate if  relative  incentives continue to be biased against
agricultural export production."
As  the evidence  illustrates,  interventions have altered the course  of
economic development  in many countries. Indirect effects have  come about in
17part because  interventions have contributed to increased government
expenditures that have exceeded their fiscal capacity to meet these costs.
Associated with these expenditures  is an increase in a country's  stock of
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currency, an  increase in inflation, a decrease  in real interest rates  ,  and an
increase  in the  real exchange rate that serves further  to  increase the
implicit subsidy to  food imports and to  tax exports.
The consequences  of interventions can lead to a change in the domestic
terms of trade against agriculture  and in favor of the urban-industrial
sector.  Naturally, this  leads to  an undervaluation of agricultural resources,
an outflow of capital from the agricultural sector, and an increase  in rural
to urban migration.  The increase in urban population would seem to place
additional pressure to  lower the prices of wage goods, primarily food staples.
These adjustments  slow the process  of economic growth in agriculture and,
0/
therefore, agriculture's contribution to  the growth process.  Furthermore,
these interventions  serve to  alter a country's international terms  of trade.
In other words, the process  of transferring resources  from agriculture by
means  that give rise  to the  distortions discussed here invariably leads  to a
"withdrawal" of a country from international markets.  The efficiency gains to
domestic resources  from economies of scale and specialization that world
markets provide are reduced. In the longer run, these efficiency losses limit
a country's capacity to supply goods and services to  a growing population.
Consider, for example,  the  impact on rural households. In the process of
economic growth, rural households  can be viewed as undergoing a vertical
disintegration - a specialization of production activities, with an increasing
share of household expenditures on preferred foods, housing, clothing, and
other nonfood items.  Even in the presence of large productivity increases  in
agricultural output, income and population growth effects can increase the
18demand for food and feed grains  and, in some  countries, increase  imports of
both  (Mellor and Johnston).  As productivity increases,  the opportunity cost
of time  to  the household increases.  Labor is  allocated away from labor-
intensive activities  and more reliance  is placed on the market for goods  and
services otherwise produced in the more traditional household.
For rural food-surplus households,  the means used by many governments to
transfer  resources from agriculture clearly serve  to retard this entire
process because  the returns  to agricultural resources are artificially biased
downwards.  Rural labor surplus-food deficit households  are  also adversely
affected.  While food prices may be lower  than they might otherwise be  in  the
absence of interventions, rural employment  opportunities are reduced.  The
additional employment opportunities  in urban-industrial areas created by the
import  substitution-industrialization policies are  usually not  sufficient to
pull the  surplus labor from agriculture that these policies have effectively
displaced.  While real wages may be higher in urban areas,  the  capital-to-
labor component of the  technology of the new industrial plants  is  often
capital-intensive relative  to a developing country's endowments.
Furthermore,  the skill  levels required of labor  to operate  these plants
may,  in any case,  exceed the  levels of rural  labor.  In many countries,
population growth coupled with insufficient  labor absorption by the  industrial
sector has resulted in a decline  in the land-labor ratio in many countries
and, in the absence  of technical change and increased capital  inputs,  a
decline  in the  real wage  (Hayami and Ruttan, Table 13-1).  Attempts to
circumvent this  problem by state  owned industrial enterprises  seem only to
exacerbate  the problem.
Public  investments  in areas where markets perform poorly (rural
infrastructure, agricultural research, rural education) serve  to enhance
19market linkages with rural households.  For example,  investments  in roads
lower spatial costs  and, thereby, the marketing margin between farm and
wholesale-level markets.  Effectively, this  improves the  terms of trade  for
market relative to home produced goods and consequently accelerates the
vertical disintegration of rural households.  To  the extent that interventions
decrease public resources available  for investments  in these areas,  rural
income streams and the capital deepening process associated with productivity
increases in agriculture are diminished.
IV. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SHOCKS
Countries pursuing the types  of policies  considered above tend to be more
susceptible to  shocks to  the world markets such as  those that occurred during
1973/74 and again in 1979/1980.9110/  Their susceptibility arises because
governments are either reluctant to  alter policy in light of shocks or they do
so with considerable lag. These policies become difficult to manage and
maintain in turbulent world markets because low-cost food and import
substitution-industrialization policies are,  for the most part, dependent on
interventions  in the  trade sector.  Since  the source  of public revenue is
primarily from taxes  and tariffs on exports and  imports, world market shocks
that adversely alter a country's  terms of trade also adversely affect a
country's fiscal capacity to carry out programs and maintain subsidies without
incurring fiscal imbalances,  let  alone trade  imbalances.
It is evident from Scobie that Egypt's policies were a fundamental
determinant of  the level of capital flows,  the efficiency with which capital
was used (e.g.,  investments  in productive activities compared to consumption
subsidies),  and the  country's capacity to  service  its debts  from export
earnings.  When food imports  are required to  equilibrate demand and supply at
announced prices,  shocks  that adversely affect a country's  terms of trade can,
20in the  absence of other adjustments,  increase food subsidies and the level  of
protection to otherwise noncompetitive  industries.  Consequently,
unsustainable government budget deficits can occur.  The frequent  result  is  an
increase in a country's  domestic and foreign borrowing.  This debt serves to
increase aggregate demand and to  further exacerbate  the distortions discussed
previously.  Furthermore, interventions  tend to prevent world market signals
from being transmitted to  the private sector so  that resource  adjustments that
would otherwise take place either do not occur or do  so with considerable lag.
In the  absence of  interventions, adverse shocks  to a country's  terms of trade
would tend to decrease  its consumption of imports and, through adjustments in
capital markets,  lower the country's  standard of living relative to countries
whose terms  of trade have  improved.
Another measure of a country's susceptibility to shocks  in world markets
is  the effect of these shocks on the probability that  it will need to
restructure  its  foreign debt.  In Chipman et.  al.,  a probit model was  fit to
data on 17  countries  for the period 1975  to  1983.  Of  the  five explanatory
variables, the  two which explained the  largest variation in the probability of
restructuring was  the World Bank's  index of price distortion (IBRD 1985b,
Table 4.1) and the  ratio of non-central public sector deficit  (a  measure of
debt held by state owned enterprises)  to  GDP  lagged two years.  This model
predicted, out of sample,  90 percent of  the countries  that rescheduled their
debt in  1984. The countries with the  largest index of price distortion and
largest ratio of non-central public sector debt  to GDP were dominated by
countries the pursued extensive  interventions of the  type discussed here.
These results  suggest that many countries  used debt  to cover the  fiscal
imbalances due  to  interventions  instead of using debt  to make capital
investments that earn a flow of returns  to meet payments on principal and debt
21service.  Rising real interest rates, appreciation of the  dollar, and
declining foreign exchange earnings, which in part was due to  trade
interventions, gave rise  to unsustained levels  of foreign debt in many
countries.  The restructuring exercise generally requires the  debtor country
to undertake adjustment policies.  In the short run, these policies seem to
have led to  considerable adjustment difficulties  for  low income households.
These difficulties might have been avoided if the  countries instead had chosen
to  liberalize their policy and reduce  the  level of government deficits over a
longer period of time.  Ironically, the  recent decline  in the value of the
dollar and  in real interest rates may allow some countries to  avoid
liberalization of their policies.
V.  SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO LIBERALIZATION
If the social  economic losses from these policies are  large, why in
general are they pursued?  While  surely incomplete, three possibilities are
considered:  (1)  policies are  the  outcome of political pressures exerted by
members of  the domestic economy seeking their own interests,  (2) policies are
mistakes, or more generally, failures of the planning process and (3)
policies, when first implemented, may have implied small social costs but,
with the passage of time,  they become difficult  to change because the
adjustment  cost incurred by groups  otherwise benefiting from the policy may be
high, and these costs may be disproportionately borne by the poor.  I have
omitted the  arguments advanced by Prebisch and de Janvry.  The reader is
referred to  Spraos and Bates, p.166-169  for a review and short critique of the
Prebisch thesis  and to Schuh  (1984) for  a critique of de Janvry's argument.
Some recent insights  into the factors motivating government intervention
can be found in Bates and Colander.  Bates rejects  the notion that governments
intervene so  as  to  secure the best interests of their societies.  Essentially,
22he accepts the hypothesis stated in (1) above. He argues  that this view is
consistent with the  observation that urban households  are potent pressure
groups  demanding low-priced  food.  They are potent because they  are
geographically concentrated and strategically located.  They can quickly
organize  and they control public services  so  that they can impose deprivation
on others.  Bates supports this observation by noting that urban unrest forms a
significant prelude  to changes of governments  in Africa.
Interests of urban consumers coincide with those  of domestic
industrialists who view low-priced food as  serving to  decrease  the pressure on
wages.  The  industrialists also  are effective  in obtaining protection from
imports because of the notion, common in many circles, that  the key to
development  lies  in industrialization.  And, in any case,  since industrial
goods  account for a small  share of most households' budgets in LDC's,  price
discrimination in favor of these goods will not have a large negative  impact
on the welfare of most households.  The result  is  policy which tends to
support  import substitution and, simultaneously, low-cost food to urban
households.
The same argument applies to  developed economies.  In advanced stages of
development,  the  food share of the budget declines  so  that consumers become
less sensitive  to  increases  in food prices.  Agriculture  is  a smaller
component in the  total economy, and farmers  are more  specialized.  Within
their area of specialization, they are better able  to organize  than are urban
groups.  This situation is virtually the  reverse of the  case for developing
countries.  With food a  small share of consumers' expenditures, protective
demands  in agriculture  can be met at  lower economic cost  to urban households.
The result is  that  the  agricultural sector is  likely to  receive protection at
the  expense of the  industrial sector.
23Others also seem to support  this general view  (Hayami and Honma and
Hayami, Anderson 1983,  1985).  They extend it to  explain policy regimes  in
developed countries  that protect agriculture and regimes  in developing
countries  that tax agriculture.  Anderson (1983 ) notes in his study of the
growth of agricultural protectionism in East Asia that countries tend to
switch from taxing to  subsidizing agriculture in the course of economic
development.  And the timing of this  switch is  associated with agriculture's
declining comparative advantage relative  to manufacturing.
While these arguments provide insights  into the motivation for
interventions, it  is  not clear why governments prefer to  intervene in markets.
To  accomplish many of  the same objectives,  they could intervene in areas where
markets function poorly.  Bates  (pp. 173-178) argues  that market interventions
facilitate  the allocation of political rents.  In his  terminology, market
interventions facilitate the  "organization of the rural constituency" who
support  the government  and to  "disorganize the rural opposition".  Markets
fail  in the provision of public goods because of the free  rider problem.  They
fail  largely for the  same reason in the provision of political rents.
Because of the  free rider problem, Olson argues that political coalitions
are likely to be narrowly based and interested in the  distribution of wealth
rather than in attempts  to allocate resources  to  increase society's output.
Drawing on Olson and Buchanan, Srinivasan  (1985) argues  in the case of India
that the policies which sought to  alleviate the conditions  of the poor were
not undesirable per se.  Instead, "It  is  that  the policies that were
introduced in the name of poverty alleviation increased the power of other
rent seeking distributional coalitions."11/  Market interventions tend to be
more effective in capturing rents  for  these coalitions than interventions  in
areas where markets function poorly.  Srinivasan  (1985) adds  that countries
24that follow inward-oriented development strategies of import substitution-
industrialization are more prone to  trigger these activities  than are in
countries  following outward-oriented strategies.  It would seem that these
arguments might also be extended to  explain, in part, the  formation of state-
owned enterprises which permit the  capturing of rents by directors and
employees  of the enterprise.
The relaxation of interventions  that distort  an economy confronts  the
political forces  that have  gained from the distortions.  In the  short run, it
is  possible that extreme  shocks to  an economy are required to  dislodge  the
political structures that have given rise  to costly forms of intervention.  In
the longer run, education and technical changes in agriculture that
significantly alter income streams  (such as  the green revolution) also induce
changes  in institutions.  Whether  these changes can come about  in highly
distorted economies  and, if they  do, whether they will be  sufficient to  induce
changes  in policy is  open to question.
Perhaps  in all countries, some  interventions and the manipulation of
policy instruments  are simply the  result of policy mistakes.  In practice,
numerous government agencies are involved in the planning-policy
implementation process. Most projects have spatial, temporal, and commodity
target-group  specificity. This process  is  complex, and characterized by a
multiplicity of policy instruments and a maze  of projects.
The development planning literature  (e.g.,  Agarwala, Cochrane and
Stopler) has documented the experience of many countries where  the
mismanagement of this  complex process  and the  development of plans based on
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faulty cause and effect and program-project implementation assumptions  have
given rise  to outcomes  that bore  little resemblance  to  initial intentions.
Since physical and administrative infrastructures are poorly developed in many
25developing countries, it  is  difficult  to target  interventions  (taxes, food
subsidies) in ways that have minimal market distorting effects.
Organizational problems often give  rise  to poly-archical decision making
structures rather than hierarchical.  That is,  interventions  are not always
centrally directed.  Instead, interventions are often carried out by semi-
autonomous agencies and state-owned enterprises without the  direct control or
knowledge of a country's  central planning-policy making authorities.  While
these factors  are not independent of the political forces mentioned above,
they must surely affect the patterns  of interventions and the welfare gains
and losses in many countries.
Interventions that have been in place for an extended period of time can
induce  structural changes  in an economy.  Put another way, the value of
protection gets built into the value of sector-specific assets  so that in the
short run, policy liberalization can have significant wealth effects.  An
example  is  industrial plants and equipment that process specific  commodities
or fabricate particular goods, which, in the absence of protection, lose part
of their value,  the  loss being greater  the more difficult  it is  to  transfer
the capital  to  other enterprises.
The human capital employed in these  enterprises will also be displaced
with the loss  of seniority rights and perhaps  the need to undergo retraining
to  obtain equivalent wage  levels in other activities.  Some of the  displaced
workers may enter the  surplus labor pools of the lower skilled, thereby
placing downward pressure on wages  in these markets  as well.  The end result
can be lower earnings  to unskilled labor  so  that lower  income households bear
a disproportionate loss  in income than do households  of higher skilled, though
perhaps displaced, workers.  In this environment, households that had not
previously been significant participants in the political process may, in  the
26light of possible changes  in policy that  alters  this structure, become
opponents  to change because of the  short run adverse wealth effects even
though,  in the  longer run, they may gain from the  the removal of these
policies.
Furthermore,  significant changes in policy imply that households need to
change their expectations regarding the  source and levels of future  income
streams.  When 70 percent of disposable household income  is allocated to food,
unskilled labor from urban households with limited ties  to rural resources
tend to bear  the brunt of the readjustment process.  The possibility of lower
incomes and the uncertainty this  implies almost surely adds  to  the political
forces mentioned above that  resist changes  in policy.
VI.  CONCLUDING  COMMENTS
The removal  of interventions  that give rise  to  the  type of distortions
considered in this paper will, almost surely, require a comprehensive plan
that deals with the  sources of resistance discussed in the previous section.
The period of  time required to  carry out the plan in an orderly manner will
likely take  longer the  greater are  the distortions and the more entrenched are
the  enterprises  that owe  their existence to  and implement the  interventions.
Substantial effort will likely be required to  convince those who face
adjustment  costs of  the long-run social cost of continuing these policies.
Issues  that a plan will need to  address  include  (1)  building and
redirecting government agencies  to design programs  and implement projects  that
are  socially profitable  in areas where markets function poorly  in the
allocation of resources,  (2) developing equitable means of divesting public
enterprises and, for  the situation of natural monopolies,  finding forms  of
organization that give rise  to  least cost operations  and pricing behavior,  (3)
27instituting alternative forms of public revenue generation other than unequal
tariff and tax rates on imports and exports that give rise  to  distortions, and
(4) formulating policies to  ameliorate adjustment costs  faced by low income
households.
Low income is  the fundamental cause of hunger and, as  implied in section
IV,  low income households tend to  face the major cost of adjustments  to
adverse changes  in their environment.  Income depends on the households'
access to  factors  of production, including skills,  that generate  income
streams sufficient  to  satisfy basic nutritional and health needs.
It is generally agreed that programs  and projects to  transfer income must
be targeted since otherwise, distortions come about.  Target  interventions
include food stamps,  fair-price shops, school lunch programs, public works
projects,  training programs, and, more specific to  low income rural
households,  input subsidies, and extension-education programs.  A self-
targeting program is  one that attracts the  targeted group because of
differences  in its characteristics relative  to higher income households.
These characteristics include the  low opportunity cost of time and the
consumption of  less preferred foods,  such as  cassava.
The difficulties of targeting include:  (1) identifying of low income
households whose "basic" nutrition and health needs are not met,  (2)  designing
the  programs and projects to  target urban households may not be  appropriate
to  target rural households, and (3) targeting programs and projects to  low
income households  often gives rise  to high administrative costs relative  to
market interventions.
The choice of interventions  to assist low income households will need to
be based on a balance between targeted and "self targeted" interventions.  The
key lies  in striking a balance in the choice of  interventions among market and
28nonmarket interventions.  This balance should seek to minimize the resource
cost between the administration of non market interventions  and the  efficiency
loss from market interventions.  Hence, it may be  desirable to  introduce
distortions in the market for cassava by subsidizing its retail  price while
maintaining the  farm level price at  its undistorted level.
Fair price shops,  food stamps and the provision of public goods  (e.g.,
water, health facilities)  that  are effective  low cost means of  targeting urban
households may not be an effective  low cost means for targeting rural
households.  Hence, targeted interventions for  rural households will likely
need to  take a different form than for  those in urban areas.  In either the
case of rural or urban households,  Sirinivasan  (1983) cautions  that "leakages"
in targeted programs need to be a major matter of concern.  Leakages occur
when ineligible  individuals are  included  in target groups  through fraud or bad
program design.  Worse still are programs where many of the  targeted get
excluded.  Srinivasan cites  the case  of India where a program for  input
subsidies  to  low income farm households was captured by higher  income groups,
thereby exhausting program funds for  the  targeted group.
29FOOTNOTES
1 See Hayami and Ruttan, Chapter  6:  Sources of Agricultural Productivity
Differences Among Countries.  They refer  to capital deepening as  an increase
in internal resources  in agriculture such as  investments  in land improvements,
livestock, the  use of modern technical inputs  (chemical and mechanical
technology) and increases  in human capital.
2/Under assumptions  that essentially preclude market failure, and provided
that lump sum income transfers are feasible, welfare economics  suggests that a
noninterventionist strategy can, in principle, maximize efficiency in
exchange, production and overall efficiency.  Within this  context, Buchanan
(p. 14)  draws the implication that  "So long as governmental  action is
restricted largely, if not entirely, to protecting individual rights, person
and property, and enforcing voluntarily negotiated private contracts, the
market process dominates  economic behavior and ensures  that any economic rents
that appear will be dissipated by the  force for competitive  entry."  The
problem, of course,  is that in developing countries  lump sum transfers are not
feasible and the conditions  that give  rise to market failure are thought to be
common.  These include:  imperfect competition, externalities, public  goods,
and risk and information asymmetries  (commonly referred to  as moral hazard and
adverse selection).  Whenever these conditions prevail, collective  action by
producers or consumers or by government can, in theory,  give rise  to an
increase  in welfare without making any other member of  the economy worse off.
See Stiglitz for a general discussion of these issues.
3/ 3 For more insights into the  economics of import substitution
industrialization policies, see "comparative Advantage and Development Policy
Twenty Years Later" in Essays  in Honor of Hollis B. Chenery, M. Syrquin, L.
Taylor nd W. Westphal, editors, Academic Press, N.Y.,  1984 and J. N. Bhagwati,
R. Brecher, and T. N. Srinivasan, "DUP Activities  and Economic  Theory",  in Neo
Classical Political Economy, D. Colander  editor, Cambridge:Ballanger Pub. Co.
1984.
4 There  is some  evidence to  suggest that protection of the domestic industrial
sector through trade interventions also  adversely affect the  production and
transfer of agricultural technology by the private sector  in some  countries
(Pray).
5In Peru, ECASA purchased domestic rice  at prices 30 percent above prices
charged to  consumers  in 1982  (Orden et.  al.).
306The  "official"  rate was  estimated as  the weighted average of the parallel
market rate  and the rate  offerred by the  central bank.  The formula used to
estimate the  local currency to dollar exchange rate  that might prevail in  the
absence of distortions  in each period was:
E =  (B(Z)(Pm)
1 + U(1+t
m ) /A(W)(Px)  l+(l-t
x )•
1 / ( 6 -
where B(Z) and A(W) are  functions  of exogenous variables Z, W  appearing in
the aggregate excess demand and supply functions for  imports  (m) and exports
(x);  P  and P  denote an index of border prices,  in dollars,  for imports
and exports,  t  and t  denote  implicit net  taxes on imports and exports, m  x
and e and n  denote the aggregate price elasticities  of excess demand and
supply respectively.  See Roe and Greene for a derivation of  this formula.
7Negative real  interest rates  arise  in many developing countries because
nominal rates remain fixed during periods  of high inflation with ramifications
to  savings and credit rationing (IMF 1985b).  At various times  during the
1970s,  negative real interest rates were particularly severe  in Brazil, Ghana,
Jamaica, Nigeria, Peru, and Turkey  (IBRD 1983,  p. 58).
8/ 8 Kuznets lists  the potential contributions  of agriculture as  (1) the  low
cost supply of food and raw materials for processing, (2) a market  for
producer and consumer goods produced by domestic  industry,  (3) a source of
factor contributions  (labor, capital)  to  the industrial sector and (4) a
source of foreign exchange  earnings and a source  of foreign exchange  savings
through the production of import competing products.
9/ 9Evidence compiled by the World Bank  (1985b) tends  to  support this view over
a large number of developing countries.  In comparing the adjustment policies
of inward oriented countries, Balassa  (1984, 19845)  found that these  countries
lost export market share and, not withstanding substantial  foreign borrowing,
they grew less  rapidly than outward oriented economies.  The latter, relying
more heavily on market forces, were found to adjust sooner to changing
conditions in world markets by accepting a slowdown in economic growth while
at  the same time, pursuing output oriented policies  of export promotion. Over
the entire period, they grew much more rapidly.  Inward oriented countries
were:  Egypt, Morocco, Philippines,  Jamaica, Peru, Tanzania, Indonesia, and
Nigeria.  Outward oriented countries were:  Tunisia, Kenya, Thailand and the
Ivory Coast.
1 Briefly, the  1973/74 shock was characterized fluctuations in prices of
primary commodities, rising prices of energy products, and a slowdown in
economic activity in the developed countries.  The  1979/80 disturbance was
characterized by another  increase in energy prices,  sharp  increases in  real
interest rates,  declining volume and declining terms of  trade for commodity
exporters  (IMF 1984,1985b).
31S 1 ince Anne Krueger's pioneering article on the political economy of rent
seeking, it has become more evident that the process of seeking to  distort
incentives can induce an additional source of welfare  loses.  The core of the
argument is  that groups affected by interventions may engage in lobby
activities which  consume resources that would otherwise be employed in
productive activities.  The withdrawing of these resources from what are
otherwise productive activities and allocating them to unproductive activities
can contribute  to  welfare losses.
12/ 12This situation occurs when the government's policy-decision making
apparatus designs and implements policies based on a false perception of the
problem confronting the economy or on a false perception that the manipulation
of a policy instrument will have a particular result.  An Example  of errors of
cause-effect is  the use of policy instruments to protect  the  import competing
sector of the economy based on the mistaken belief that the outcome will  lead
to  an industrial sector that can compete  in world markets and eventually
induce a more rapid rate of economic growth.
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